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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-COURT ORDERS BROAD- RELIEF TO INMATES
THROUGHOUT THE VIRGINIA PENAL SYSTEM WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.
A class action was instituted by prisoners of the Virginia Penal
System for injunctive relief against the supervisors of the state's cor-
rectional system. The court assumed jurisdiction under Title 28
U.S.C. sections 1343 (3), (4), 2201, and Title 42 U.S.C. sections 1981,
1983, and 1985.1 The inmates based their grievances on the various
penalties imposed, the reasons given for invoking these sanctions, and
the adjudication process within the prison. Such punishment included
removal to solitary confinement, where inmates had been chained,
1. The relevant texts of these statutes are as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation under color of any State law . . . of any
right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights ....
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970):
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . .. any court of the
United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal obligations of any
interested party seeking such declaration ....
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory . . . to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970):
(3) .'.. in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section [(1) Preventing
officer from performing his duties; (2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party,
witness, or juror; (3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges], if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance
of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation,
against any one or more of the conspirators.
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tear gassed, kept nude, served bread and water, crowded into small
cells, and deprived of mattresses for up to three days. In one instance,
an inmate was struck with a tear gas gun and then chained to his
cell for five days, without even being released to respond to the calls
of nature. Inmates had been prohibited from conducting litigation,
rendering legal assistance to other inmates, and writing to lawyers
and public officials. In addition, inmates had been deprived of ac-
quired "good time"2 and were "padlocked" into their cells; mental de-
fectives were confined in maximum security units. These penalties
had been imposed, to a large extent, without the protections afforded
by traditional notions of due process. No general regulations specified
which offenses justified loss of "good time" or commitment to a soli-
tary cell. Furthermore, prisoners had been penalized for vaguely de-
fined offenses such as "misbehavior" and "agitation." At disciplinary
proceedings prisoners were denied the assistance of counsel, the right
to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and were not served with written
notice of the charges against them. No findings of fact were made by
the, disciplinary committee nor could its ultimate decision be appealed;
the committee at times included the accusing guard. Inmates had often
been placed in solitary confinement by prison guards without even the
pretense of a hearing. Held: the court finds as to each of these points a
disregard of constitutional rights so basic as to violate fundamental con-
ceptions of due process and humane treatment. Finding violations of
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, Judge, Merhige enjoined the bread and water diet, use of
chains, handcuffs, tape, tear gas. (except under special circumstances),
any corporal punishment, stripping of inmates' clothing in the ab-
sence of a doctor's written consent, and the placing of more than one
inmate in a solitary cell. In order to satisfy minimum due process
standards where serious penalties-such as loss of "good time" and
solitary confinement-may be imposed, the court ordered officials:
(1) to provide prisoners with written notice of pending charges; ()
to provide a hearing conducted by an impartial tribunal at which the
prisoner would have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to be
represented by counsel; and (3) to provide a decision based solely upon
evidence presented at the proceeding. Furthermore, the court, while
2. Ten days are credited against a prisoner's sentence for every twenty days served
without a rule infraction, thus enabling him to be released sooner than his initial
sentence would indicate. VA. CODE § 52-213 (Supp. 1970).
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not ordering the creation of appellate review, insisted that any review
provided must be restricted to the particular charge and the evidence
presented below. In addition, the court enjoined interference with
mail sent to courts, counsel, or public officials. It ordered release from
solitary confinement or maximum security and the restoration of
"good time" to all inmates who had been denied proceedings with
minimum due process safeguards. However, the possibility remained
that these penalties could be reinstated after such hearings had been
conducted. Prison officials were also ordered to file a list of rules govern-
ing inmate conduct with the court, to promulgate these rules among
the prison population, and to report any future applications of phys-
ical restraint or tear gas. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.
Va. 1971).3
INTRODUGTION
For years, federal courts have shown considerable reluctance to
interfere with the administrative process within state penal institu-
tions.4 This "hands-off" policy has been justified on the grounds that
relief should first be sought in state courts5 and that courts lack the
expert knowledge of prison administrators, who should be granted
broad discretion in executing their duties.6 Moreover, it has been
argued that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justi-
fied by the considerations underlying our penal system."7 Nevertheless,
within recent years federal courts have inquired into the administrative
process where there is evidence that fundamental constitutional rights
have been violated.8 For example, the issue of religious freedom in
3. Hereinafter referred to as instant case.
4. "It clearly appears to be the general rule that, except in extreme cases, the
courts will not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with the enforcement of its rules
and regulations, or its discipline." Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir.
1963). Accord, McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); Roberts v.
Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.
1954).
5. United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957).
"6. "Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere
with the ordinary prison rules or regulations. ... No authorities are needed to support
those statements." Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954); accord, Powell
v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa.
1958).
7. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
8. "The hands-off doctrine operates reasonably to the extent that it preventsjudicial review of deprivations which are necessary or reasonable concomitants of im-
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prison has been highlighted by a series of cases in which Black Muslims
have challenged infringements upon their religious practices.0 Admin-
istrators have often justified the need for restraints upon such activi-
ties either by arguing that Black Muslims are a violent group who
threaten the security of the institution or by simply failing to recog-
nize these individuals as adherents to a "bona fide" religion.10 While
courts have sanctioned some Muslim practices, others have been pro-
hibited under the theory that a "compelling state interest" was thought
to be imperiled." Because of the courts' tendency to uphold any regu-
lations that seem vaguely related to the preservation of order and disci-
pline in the prison, the burden of proving lack of justification for offi-
cial action is usually placed upon the prisoner. 2
prisonment. Deprivations of reasonable medical care and of reasonable access to the
courts are not among such concomitants, however." Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993,
994 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (legal assistance
in achieving access to a federal forum); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)
(racial segregation); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971) (religious free-
dom); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (freedom of speech
and due process safeguards).
9. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th
Cir. 1971); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pcgelow, 291
F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd sub
nom. Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); Sa Marion v. McGinnis, 253 F.
Supp. 738 (W.D.N.Y. 1966).
In the instant case, one inmate while washing the exposed parts of his body, as
required by the Black Muslim faith, was discovered by a guard. After refusing to obey
the latter's order to stop, the prisoner was committed to solitary confinement. He was
also told not to proselytize his beliefs with more than one or two others at a time and
was threatened to be transferred from the prison camp if he continued to engage in
this type of activity. Though the court did not "explicitly" enjoin such practices, it
would seem from the spirit of the case that it meant to include them within its injunctive
relief. Instant case at 641-42.
10. As of September, 1971, the Attica Correctional Facility provided no minister
or meeting place for Black Muslims. Moreover, "[w]hile important Christian and Jewish
holidays were observed ... the Islamic holy month of Ramadan... was not recognized.
Muslim inmates were required to attend meals, although their religion forbade them
to eat." ATrIcA, THE OFFcAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMwMISSION ON
ATTicA 73-74 (1972). See In re Fergusen, 55 Cal.2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rep.
753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
11. See cases cited in supra note 9. In Rowland, prison officials failed to sustain
the burden of proving that a "compelling state interest" would be promoted by pre-
venting an inmate from receiving a Black Muslim newspaper. They were allowed, how-
ever, to forbid the wearing of a medallion because of its possible use as a weapon.
12. "If a tractable inmate is subjected to cruel and unusual punishment or if his
exercise of a constitutional right is denied without semblance of justification arising out
of the necessity to preserve order and discipline within the prison, he may have a right
of judicial review." McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964) (emphasis
added).
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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
When prison authorities have imposed penalties deemed to vio-
late the prohibitions of the eighth amendment, courts have intervened
in the administrative process. 13 The first problem that arises, however,
is to define which punishments are "cruel and unusual." While the
amendment was originally intended to forbid only the barbaric meth-
ods of torture which were once so fashionable in England,14 courts in
this century have recognized that it should reflect current conceptions
of humane treatment.' 5 As with other constitutional principles, the
eighth amendment "must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth."' 6 Consequently, in Weems v. United
States,'7 the Supreme Court extended the amendment to punishments
that involved an element of brutality but were impermissibly dispro-
portionate to the offense. This wider interpretation was subsequently
limited by the Court 8 until its decision in Trop v. Dulles,"0 where it
was held that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 20 Following such enlightened standards, the imposition of
loss of citizenship on those found guilty of desertion from the military
was considered "penal" in nature and held to be "cruel and unusual"
punishment. More recently, the amendment's scope was further ex-
panded to proscribe the punishment of an individual for maintaining
the "status" of a narcotics addict.21
The lower federal courts have very gradually begun to adopt the
broader interpretation of "cruel and unusual" punishment set forth
in the later Supreme Court decisions. In doing so, they have increas-
ingly frowned upon the use of corporal punishment as, a disciplinary
measure in prison. In Jackson v. Bishop,2 2 the use of a strap to disci-
13. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright v.'McMann,
321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
14. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
15. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
16. Id. at 373.
17. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
18. Louisiana ex tel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (it was not "cruel
and unusual" to execute an inmate in the electric chair after the first attempt failed);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the Court preferred
to find that the sexual sterilization of habitual criminals was a denial of equal pro-
tection, rather than to decide the issue under the eighth amendment).
19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
20. Id. at 101.
21. Robinsonv. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
22. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
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pline an inmate was held violative of the eighth amendment. 23 In
addition, living conditions within prisons have been held subject to
the amendment's prohibitions. The Second Circuit in Wright v. Mc-
Mann24 considered it "cruel and unusual" to place a naked inmate in
a cell for a substantial period of time, exposed to the cold winter
temperature, and deprived of such articles as soap and toilet paper.26
In fact, one recent case held that
confinement itself within a given institution may amount to a
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where
the confinement is characterized by conditions and practices so bad
as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people
even though a particular inmate may never personally be subject
to any disciplinary actions.2 6
This court thus chose to depart from the original notion that in order
for punishment to be "cruel and unusual," it must be "specifically"
directed at an individual.27 In Sostre v. McGinnis,2 the Second Cir-
cuit refused to find that extended time in solitary confinement "by
itself" amounted to a constitutional violation. At the same time, other
courts have chosen to ignore the fact that the scope of the eighth
amendment has been expanded far beyond the outright prohibition
of physical torture.29
Why have the courts been so slow in adhering to the concept
of a dynamic eighth amendment? The problem lies in the standards
which the courts have been applying in the absence of any specific
guidelines emanating from the Supreme Court. Basically, they have
23. This method of punishment has also been criticized in AM*ERICAN CORRECTIONAL
ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 417 (3d ed. 1966).
24. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. See also Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Knuckles v.
Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970);
Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
The court in the instant case indicated that it may be the cumulative effect of such
deprivations which ultimately violates the eighth amendment. It chose not to enjoin
the denial of bedding in the absence of a finding that sanitary conditions were also in-
adequate. "If the cell is otherwise clean, and well heated, and the prisoner keeps his
clothing, it [denial of bedding] should not be detrimental." Instant case at 649.
26. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971).
27. In the cases cited in supra note 25, living conditions amounting to cruel and
unusual punishment were directed at specific individuals rather than at the general prison
population.
28. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. Roberts v. Peppersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966); Ruark v. Schooley,
211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962).
RECENT CASES
been following one or more of the three possible approaches suggested
by Justice Goldberg in Rudolph v. Alabama.30 Utilizing this tripartite
approach, the courts might inquire whether evolving notions of de-
cency, which are universally accepted, are violated by a particular
penalty,31 whether the punishment fits the crime, 32 or whether ac-
cepted penological objectives could be as easily effectuated by less
harsh means.3 3 The first two tests, however, are excessively subjec-
tive and are not conducive to an expanding interpretation of "cruel
and unusual" punishment. Many courts have not yet rid themselves of
the ingrained conception of an eighth amendment which prohibits
only the most deplorable acts of barbarism. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that "in a judge's opinion" a particular abuse is not "shocking to
the general conscience" or "disproportionate" to the offense.
Is a judicial tribunal really competent to gauge what in fact shocks
the "universal community?" Even assuming an affirmative answer, one
must still contend with a second weakness inherent in this standard.
Does one really wish to treat an inmate in accordance with "present"
notions of decency? Past practices such as burning and disembowling
people alive may not have been "shocking" to those who lived during
the Spanish Inquisition. It is only now that people in their "civilized
wisdom" condemn such inhumane punishment. Will not future genera-
tions similarly consider many of our accepted practices as violative of
the eighth amendment? To allow public opinion to guide our treat-
ment of prisoners is not only a difficult standard to apply, but also
sanctions the continuation of many severe acts of inmate mistreatment.
Since there is no way to determine what future public opinion will
consider to be "shocking to the general conscience" nor how far in the
future to look before stopping to choose a standard, it would be best
30. 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
31. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910).
32. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See also Ralph v. Warden,
438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970) (imposition of the death penalty on a convicted rapist
who had not endangered the life of his victim was "cruel and unusual" punishment);
Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The use of this standard is
supported by the American Correctional Association. It reasons that punishment dis-
proportionate to the offense increases the chances that the inmate will continue to be a
disciplinary problem and return to crime after release. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Asso-
CrATION STANDARDS 417 (1966). In Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1071 (1964), the author attacks the constitutional authority for this
approach. He argues that the decision in Weems was based on a "combination" of exces-
siveness and severity of physical punishment.
33. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 677 (1962) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
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to discard this approach along with the highly subjective second test.
Instead, courts should seek to determine whether accepted penolog-
ical objectives could be as easily effectuated by less harsh means. This
standard has the advantage of requiring more objective criteria. In-
stead of ascertaining the values of the community, the court may in-
quire into the effect of proposed methods of treatment. If it finds that
a legitimate end (such as rehabilitation or security) is being achieved,
the court would then have to determine whether less severe methods
could also be utilized. Courts which have denied relief in the past
might very well have decided differently had they been compelled to
adhere to this approach. For example, in Sostre v. McGinnis3 4 the Sec-
ond Circuit emphasized its belief that an extended period of time in
solitary confinement was not sufficiently barbaric to constitute an
eighth amendment violation. It was also satisfied that the punishment
was "motivated" by reasons of security. The court, however, never
questioned whether such severe treatment would in fact achieve that
end, nor did it consider whether less drastic alternatives could have
been employed. A firm commitment by the Supreme Court for such
an approach would help to eliminate judicial tendencies to inhibit
the expansion of the eighth amendment.
DuE PROCESS
The desire to refrain from interfering with the prison disciplinary
system has led some federal courts to deny relief when inmates have
been deprived of certain procedural due process safeguards. These
courts have considered various safeguards to be "privileges" granted
by the state rather than constitutionally protected rights.8 Thus in
Powell v. Hunter,36 loss of statutory "good time" was considered merely
the denial of a "privilege," not entitling the prisoner to relief.
This "right-privilege" distinction has often been applied to other
administrative situations. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy,37 the Supreme Court upheld the summary exclusion of a
cook from employment at a naval gun factory after he was alleged to
be a security risk. The Court explained that "[w]here it has been pos-
sible to characterize the private interest (perhaps in oversimplification)
34. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1970); Courtney v. Bishop,
409 F.2d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 1969).
36. 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949).
37. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
RECENT CASES
as a mere privilege subject to the Executive's plenary power, it has
traditionally been held that notice and hearing are not constitutionally
required."38 Yet the practice of denying relief by labelling the particular
deprivation as a "privilege" has been vigorously rejected when an in-
dividual has incurred a "substantial" loss. Thus in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son,39 the Supreme Court held that the statutory prohibition of public
assistance benefits to residents of less than one year was a violation of
the equal protection clause. The Court has also ruled that denial of
a tax exemption to veterans who fail to take a loyalty oath contravenes
the first amendment.40 Moreover, when a South Carolina statute de-
nied an individual unemployment compensation because of her re-
fusal to accept Saturday employment, in violation of her religious be-
liefs, the Court stated that "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial
of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 41 In Goldberg
v. Kelly,42 the Court also held that the termination of welfare pay-
ments to recipients who were denied notice and an adequate hearing
violated their due process rights. This decision was reaffirmed in the
recent case of Morrissey v. Brewer,43 which required certain minimal
due process procedures in parole revocation hearings. Logically, the
"right-privilege" distinction should be equally invalid in the prison
setting.44
Prior to the granting of procedural due process safeguards, courts
must first determine what "process" is in fact "due." The Supreme
Court has attempted to set forth general standards. In Hannah v.
Larche,40 it noted that due process is an "elusive" and "undefinable"
concept. Factors to be considered are "[t]he nature of the alleged
right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden
38. Id. at 895.
39. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
41. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S: 398, 404 (1963).
42. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d
998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City
Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
43. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
44. Writers too, have warned against use of this doctrine as a means of lending
support to administrators' unbridled discretion. "Even though the privilege doctrine
should not be condemned in all its applications, its use has generally been unfortunate
in furthering the development of discretionary power that is inadequately confined,
structured, and checked." K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTIC. 176 (1971).
45. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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on that proceeding.' 46 Another relevant consideration was suggested
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,,47 in which the
Attorney General listed three organizations as Communist, without
having granted any of them notice or the opportunity to be heard.
Justice Frankfurter noted that "[t]his Court is not alone in recognizing
that the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous
loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hard-
ships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." 48 The
Court has also reasoned that the requirement of procedural safe-
guards depends upon the nature of the governmental function in-
volved and the private interest which it affects. 49 These last two tests
were both applied in Goldberg v. Kelly. In addition to its finding that
a denial of welfare payments causes an individual to suffer "grievous
loss," the Court held that "the interest of the eligible . . .recipient
of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments
not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing
concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative
burdens."50
When prison inmates could suffer "grievous loss" because sub-
stantial individual interests might be denied, courts have required
minimum procedural safeguards.51 Such protections include the right
to adequate notice of the charges52 and an opportunity to be heard by
an impartial tribunal.53 The courts, however, have been somewhat re-
46. Id. at 442.
47. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
48. Id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
49. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
50. 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1971).
51. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (ist Cir. 1970); Clutchette v. Procuner,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (the court defines "grievous loss" to include in-
definite confinement in segregation, possible increase in a prisoner's sentence, forfeiture
of earnings, isolated confinement for over ten days, and the possibility that an inmate
may be referred to the district attorney for criminal prosecution); Meola v. Fitzpatrick,
322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1971) (loss of "good time"); Carothers v. Follette, 314
F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (concerning loss of "good time" and solitary confine-
ment).
52. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 195 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum); Clutchette v.
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165,
172 (D. Md. 1971); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878, 885 (D. Mass. 1971);
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
53. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (N.D.N.Y.
1970).
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luctant to provide the remaining procedural guarantees which are
common in the normal trial setting. Recently, in Sostre v. McGinnis,"
the-Second Circuit refused to extend the requirements of procedural
due process in the belief that a prison disciplinary proceeding is less
adversarial and complex than the usual criminal trial. Yet a prisoner
who is accused of a particular violation and faces the prospect of seri-
ous punishment is certainly strongly motivated to defend his interests.
Where loss of "good time" may result, his very freedom is at stake.
Opposing him are administrators who are highly conscious of the need
to maintain prison security. Where is there lack of adversity? In addi-
tion, when "simple" questions of fact are presented, can an attorney's
role be considered negligible? One of the essential functions of counsel
is his ability to cross-examine witnesses in order to reveal what truth,
if any, supports the testimony. Recent decisions (including the instant
case) are now recognizing the need to provide inmates with all of the
procedural safeguards mandated by the fourteenth amendment. Thus
they require that prisoners be provided with the rights of cross-exam-
ination 5 and representation by counsel. 58
Included within the scope of "due process" is the requirement
that laws be sufficiently clear and understandable. Vague rules prevent
an individual from receiving "fair warning" that a particular act is
forbidden and carries with it a corresponding penalty.57 Thus the Su-
preme Court has held that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."58 Moreover, the Court
has often expressed the fear that "vague" laws could be applied to
54. 442 F.2d 178 (2dCir. 1971).
55. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See also
Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853,
862 (2d Cir. 1970).
56. Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1970). The court in the instant
case required only "retained" counsel. Thus, it followed Bearden v. South Carolina, 443
F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971), which held that indigent parolees would receive free
counsel only if it were in the interests of fairness. For a recent case which requires
"appointed" counsel if an inmate is charged with a violation which is also punishable
by state authorities, see Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
57. Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964); Original Fayette County Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington,
309 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
58. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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include legally protected activities. 59 This apprehension increases when
one considers the possible "chilling" effect such statutes may have on
the exercise of one's constitutional rights. An individual may certainly
hesitate before conducting legal activity if he has no way of ascertain-
ing whether his actions will be caught in the web of some ambiguously
written rule. Furthermore, "vague" laws may be applied arbitrarily
if courts and juries have no way of interpreting them with certainty, thus
denying an individual his "due process" guarantees.60
Within a prison setting, the "vagueness" problem becomes even
more acute. The "fair warning" aspect of "due process" is more vul-
nerable to abuse in such institutions than in the outside community.
Beyond the prison walls, criminal acts are often known by the offender
to be prohibited by virtue of the moral sanctions attached to them by
society. When this behavior is proscribed by vaguely written statutes,
the presumption that one knows the law must, of necessity, collapse.
Yet it could be argued that the community's moral disapproval of such
actions gives an individual "fair warning" to refrain from conduct of
this sort. In prison, however, many rules and regulations forbid those
activities which are ordinarily permitted in the outside world. Reasons
of efficiency and security often replace those of moral origin. An in-
mate under these circumstances can neither be presumed to know a law
that is incomprehensibly vague, nor can he obtain "fair warning" from
the nature of the act itself. Consequently, some courts have expressed
an awareness of the problem of vague standards and arbitrary treat-
59. "This Court has repeatedly held that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). Accord, Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969);
Original Fayette County Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F. Supp. 89
(W.D. Tenn. 1971).
60. Original Fayette County Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v. Ellington, 309 F.
Supp. 89 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
61. In Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 881 (1966), it was noted that guards often are the source of such abuses. "(Plrison
guards may be more vulnerable to the corrupting influence of unchecked authority than
most people. It is well known that prisons are operated on minimum budgets and that
poor salaries and working conditions make it difficult to attract high calibre personnel."
Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D.R.I. 1970) noted that "[w]hile the court
has decided to place this grievance [lack of a clearly defined code of inmate conduct)
beyond the reach of this case, it is one which should be given serious consideration."
See also ATTICA, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMasISSION
ON ATTICA 74 (1972): "The rules at Attica were poorly communicated, often petty,
senseless, or repressive and they were selectively enforced." Moreover, "[i]nmates often
learned the rules only after they broke them."
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ment of prisoners."' In Talley v. Stephens,6 the district court required
"fair warning" where corporal punishment might be inflicted. In recog-
nition of this serious problem, the American Correctional Association
has recommended that standards for dealing with inmates should in-
clude notice to the inmates of the rules of prison conduct and conse-
quences of violation.63
Another area of major concern to those confined within our penal
institutions is their ability to seek post-judicial relief. It is now well
settled that inmates have a right to obtain access to the courts free of
administrative restrictions.64 The Supreme Court has defined this right
to include the provision of legal assistance to prisoners. In Johnson v.
Avery, it held that "unless and until the state provides some reasonable
alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-
conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation ... barring
inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners."6 5 It was
therefore not surprising that the court in the instant case issued in-
junctive relief to stop certain restrictions placed upon this right.66 Of
more significance, however, was its recognition that administrative re-
straints may assume various forms, including the "transfer" of inmates
to other institutions. Courts have generally considered the transfer of
inmates to be an administrative function which should more properly
be left to the discretion of prison officials. 67 Yet the effect of penalizing
a prisoner, by sending him to a higher security institution after he has
begun to seek post-judicial relief, may be just as severe as an outright
prohibition of the necessary legal materials and assistance.
Another type of "punitive transfer" is the shifting of "trouble-
makers" from one institution to another as a means of punishment. The
court in the instant case considered only those transfers which were
"motivated" by the desire to restrict legal activity, and did not address
itself to the propriety of such actions when motivated by purely puni-
62. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
63. MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 23, at 266-68.
64. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941);
Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, (4th
Cir. 1966).
65. 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
66. Instant case at 656-57.
67. See Lipscomb v. Stevens, 349 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
993 (1966); United States ex rel. Gallagher v. Daggett, 326 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn.
1971); United States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd,
419 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1855 (1970); Konigsberg v.
Clarence, 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970).
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tive reasons. However, these practices are widespread and should also
be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Whenever the effect of such transfers
is to condemn a prisoner to suffer "grievous loss" by confining him in
an institution where living conditions are much more oppressive and
the distance from his family increased, should he not be afforded pro-
cedural due process safeguards? The courts, unfortunately, have not
yet gone this far.08
RATIONALE
Though aware of the "hands-off" policy, the court in the instant
case chose to assert an active role. It did so because constitutional rights
were being undermined by prison authorities, who were unable to show
that a valid penological end (such as rehabilitation) was being achieved.
By placing unusual emphasis upon this particular standard, the court
found a wide range of deprivations to be violative of the eighth amend-
ment. The practice of serving meals lacking in adequate nutritional
content has traditionally been considered to lie outside of the amend-
ment's reach. One federal case has held that "the mere allegation of an
inadequate diet with accompanying loss of weight is certainly not
enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment."0 Nevertheless,
the court in Landman enjoined the bread and water diet as an unneces-
sary infliction of pain that served no legitimate end and which totally
contradicted the notion of maintaining respect for human dignity. The
practice of removing inmates' clothing was also considered degrading. In
order for this practice to be permitted, the court required that a doctor
authorize in writing that no health problem would result and that
there would be a substantial risk of self-injury if the prisoner were
given garments. In addition, Judge Merhige enjoined the confinement
of inmates in chains or handcuffs in their cells. He recognized that
the only justification for such measures would be the prevention of
self-inflicted harm and that less drastic means could be used to achieve
68. "The Division of Correction has the right to transfer prisoners from one in-
stitution to another, whether to a higher, equal or lower security status, for administra-
tive, therapeutic, adjustment or other reason, without the need for a hearing under
these procedures." Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Md. 1971).
69. Heft v. Parker, 258 F. Supp. 507, 508 (M.D. Pa. 1966). See Novak v. Beto,
453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); Belk v. Mitchell, 294 F. Supp. 800 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
But see Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968) (the court denied
relief because they believed that the prisoners were being served a "balanced ration");
Herrell v. Mancusi, Civil No. 70-540 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (preliminary injunction re-
stricting prison officials from providing a diet limited to bread and water in contraven-
tion of Department regulations).
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this valid aim. Moreover, the eighth amendment was "extended" to
forbid the use of tear gas to disable a man who poses no present danger.
The Fourth Circuit had previously refused to prohibit this abuse.70
While crowding inmates into a single cell has generally been enjoined
only in conjunction with other deprivations, 71 the court also held over-
crowding "by itself" to be "cruel and unusual" when serving only a
vindictive purpose. Unfortunately, however, the court did not go as
far as it might have to bar this particular practice. It implied that such
an abuse would have been constitutional had it been caused by the
lack of physical facilities necessary to alleviate overcrowding.
Where deprivations were deemed to be "substantial," the court
ordered procedural due process safeguards to be instituted. Since the
denial of constitutional rights was considered to be an inherent feature
of the entire Virginia penal system, it distinguished the instant case
from Sostre v. McGinnis.72 Moreover, the court rejected the "right-
privilege" distinction, and instead, chose to follow the example set
in Goldberg v. Kelly.7 The "grievous loss" suffered by inmates was
weighed against any possible governmental interest. Denial of accrued
"good time," placing an inmate in solitary or maximum security con-
finement, and "padlocking" a prisoner within his cell for more than
ten days were found to be substantial individual deprivations.7 4 When
the court found that minimum due process safeguards would not im-
pede legitimate prison functions, it ordered appropriate relief.7 5
70. See Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881
(1966).
71. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302
F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970).
72. According to Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 203 (2d Cir. 1971), "[c]on-
sideration of Sostre's case does not properly raise any question whether New York
prisons regularly or systematically ignore minimal due process requirements ... "
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
74. Instant case at 654. The court in the instant case classified penalties into a
"major" or a "minor" category. The major penalties mentioned in the text required
minimum due process safeguards. The "minor" penalties (minor fines, loss of com-
missary rights, restriction of individual recreational privileges, or padlocking for less
than ten days) required "oral" notice, an opportunity to be heard by an impartial
tribunal, and a chance to cross-examine the complaining officer and to present testimony.
The court also "recommended" that those inmates charged with "minor" violations be
permitted to choose a lay advisor to represent them. Id.
75. See text at supra pp. 348-49. It is interesting to note that as the product of a
six month study completed prior to the Attica incident, a City of New York subcom-
mittee suggested procedural safeguards for those in jail which are substantially similar
to the relief granted in the instant case. PRISON REFORM, REPORT, PROPOSED LEGISLA-
TION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF PENAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
TO THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
B-12-13 (Oct. 16, 1971).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
This judicial intervention in the state prison's administrative pro-
cedures was accomplished by way of the Civil Rights Act. 0 Use of this
Act, however, may conffict with the policies governing jurisdictional re-
quirements of the federal habeas corpus remedy.7 In the instant case,
the court easily assumed jurisdiction over eighth and fourteenth amend-
ment violations and supplied valid reasons for the relief granted.
Addressing itself to a possible problem with respect to its power
to determine the "good time" issue, the court reacted to the Second
Circuit's decision in Rodriguez v. McGinnis.78 In this decision, the
court disallowed a claim of unconstitutional denial of "good time" on
the ground that it should have been brought under the federal habeas
corpus statute because it involved "release from custody." It followed
the "circumvention rule": 79 one may not initiate action under the
Civil Rights Act in order to avoid the exhaustion of state remedies re-
quired by the federal habeas corpus statute.80 This exhaustion require-
ment means that an inmate in need of immediate relief must face the"
prospect of expensive and time-consuming litigation prior to reaching
a federal forum. Subsequent to the decision in the instant case, how-
ever, the Second Circuit conducted an en banc rehearing and reversed
itself.8 ' This action was taken in response to the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Wilwording v. Swenson 2 which held that a proceed-
ing by inmates challening conditions of confinement, though cognizable
under federal habeas corpus, might also be brought under the Civil
Rights Act. The court in the instant case rendered its decision too
early to have derived benefit from these subsequently decided cases.
Nevertheless, it justified the inclusion of "good time" relief within its
jurisdiction. Judge Merhige reasoned that prevailing precedent within
the Fourth Circuit disapproves of utilizing habeas corpus where "good
time" relief is sought. The court relied on Roberts v. Pegelow8a which
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971).
78. 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. granted sub noma. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972).
79. This terminology is taken from Justice Doyle in his excellent discussion of the
jurisdiction question in Edwards v. Schmidt, 321 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). This exhaustion requirement is not a prerequisite to a
civil rights action. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer,
392 U.S. 639 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
81. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972).
82. 404U.S. 249 (1971).
83. 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
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denied habeas corpus relief, stating that "[t]he traditional function
of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of detention."8 4 From
this statement, the court in Landman inferred that the Fourth Circuit
has not extended the scope of habeas corpus beyond challenges to the
"legality of a conviction" so as to include "good time" relief. It be-
lieved, however, that the Fourth Circuit would consider a civil rights
action to be an acceptable alternative. The court further noted that
while the scope of habeas corpus has broadened within recent years,85
courts have also applied the Civil Rights Act to various claims of con-
stitutional violations, including those related to "good time" for-
feitures.8 6 In addition, it recognized that the extension of one type of
remedy does not necessarily require the automatic shrinkage of any
other.87 Furthermore, the court realized that it was not bound by the
first Rodriguez decision. The "circumvention rule" upon which that
decision was based has often been applied to situations where the
"legality of conviction or sentencing" (including confinement pur-
suant to administrative authority) has been challenged.88 Thus the
initial Rodriguez decision could be viewed as an attempt to extend
the rule, at least where the restoration of "good time" is sought. In the
instant case, the court's rejection of this decision may then be viewed
as a disapproval of expanding the "circumvention rule" beyond situa-
tions where the conviction process is under attack.
It is interesting to note that the court in the instant case could
have reached the same conclusion on the "good time" issue merely
by distinguishing itself from the first Rodriguez decision. In order to
understand fully what the Second Circuit had held, one must first con-
sider its prior decision in Sostre v. McGinnis.s9 The court restored to
Sostre 124/ days "good time" while maintaining that it had jurisdic-
tion under the Civil Rights Act. Since Sostre involved various claims
of constitutional violations, the court found that the "ultimate object"
of the action was not to obtain release from prison. Thus, the Second
84. Id. at 549.
85. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
86. United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968); Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D.
Mass. 1971) ; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
87. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d
548, 551 (1st Cir. 1970).
88. Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Walker, 317
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963); Baker v. McGinnis, 286 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Davis v. Maryland, 248 F. Supp. 951 (D. Md. 1965).
89. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Circuit stated that it was not deciding the question whether title
42 U.S.C. section 1983 would be appropriate for a claim based "solely"
on an unconstitutional denial of "good time."90 With Sostre, the court
paved the way for its subsequent decision in the first Rodriguez case.
Though it made no reference to its prior holding in Sostre, one may
infer that it considered its present proceeding to focus "solely" on the
"good time" question and believed that the "ultimate object" was re-
lease. In fact, the effect of the "good time" restoration was to entitle
Rodriguez to "immediate" release. The court in the instant case could
therefore have easily considered the facts to constitute a Sostre rather
than a Rodriguez situation. As in Sostre, the "good time" issue was
merely one of an assortment of constitutional attacks.
The "second" Rodriguez decision was also an interesting and
somewhat perplexing case. Beginning with its decision in Monroe v.
Pape,91 the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act may
preempt any existing state remedy. "The federal remedy is supplemen-
tary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and re-
fused before the federal one is invoked. ' 92 The state remedy in that case
was the ability to seek "judicial" relief under the state's statutes and con-
stitution. Its subsequent decisions reaffirmed the same principle.98
Moreover, in Houghton v. Shafer,94 the Court applied this principle
when a "prisoner" was seeking relief. Nevertheless the Second Circuit
apparently ignored these decisions when it decided the first Rodriguez
case. It is true that Houghton, unlike Rodriguez, involved the exhaus-
tion of "administrative" remedies. Yet in conjunction with the Court's
prior decision in Monroe, the Second Circuit could have easily recog-
nized the overlap of state "judicial" and federal remedies in a prison
context. It simply chose not to do so. However, when Wilwording v.
Swenson 95 was decided, the Second Circuit felt "compelled" to reverse
its prior position. Wilwording explicitly held that a "prisoner" could
resort to a section 1983 proceeding without having to initiate the state
"federal habeas corpus" remedy. This case, however, involved a chal-
lenge to "conditions of confinement." It was "not" directed at an un-
constitutional denial of "good time." Thus the Second Circuit could
90. Id. at 204 n.50.
91. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
92. Id. at 183.
93. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963).
94. 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
95. 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
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have remained consistent to its policy of restricting an inmate's access
to section 1983 by distinguishing Wilwording. After all, it somehow
distinguished Sostre where "good time" was not the "sole" issue. Why
did it not distinguish Wilwording where "good time" was not "an"
issue at all? It would seem that the Supreme Court finally convinced
the Second Circuit that the Civil Rights Act is supplementary to the
state habeas corpus action, at least when the "legality of conviction" is
not being challenged. The importance of the reaction to this latter Su-
preme Court decision cannot be stressed enough. To allow the "circum-
vention rule" to accompany the federal habeas corpus statute as it in-
creases in scope would lead to very undesirable consequences. This
statute provides relief to those "in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States."96 Such broad language
could conceivably be made to cover any infringement upon an inmate's
federal rights. As the use of federal habeas corpus increases, access to
title 42 of U.S.C. section 1983 would correspondingly decrease, and
state prisoners would be hindered in seeking the protection of an Act
presumably intended to include "all" citizens. However, by allowing
exclusive use of habeas corpus in those areas where it traditionally has
been applied and permitting an overlap of the federal and state remedies
for such relief (including the restoration of "good time") to which
habeas corpus has expanded, such adverse consequences could be
avoided.
When the court in the instant case ordered prison authorities to
file with it a list of rules concerning permissible standards of behavior
to be followed by inmates and corresponding penalties for noncompli-
ance, it granted a rather vital type of remedy. Courts generally face
"individual" complaints and respond with appropriately narrow relief.
When, however, a tribunal attempts to rectify conditions prevalent
throughout an entire penal system in an action initiated by repre-
sentatives of prisoners as a "class," broad remedies appear quite reason-
able. Not only do inmates have the constitutional right of "fair warn-
ing," but vague rules accompanied by arbitrary treatment can only
impede any existing attempt at rehabilitation. Though the court could
be viewed as assuming an administrative function, the same is no less
true when it is ordering prison officials to cease certain practices deemed
to be "cruel and unusual" punishment or to adopt certain measures
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
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which will accord procedural due process. The point is that the admin-
istrators are not meeting their responsibilities:
The typical failure in our system that is correctable is not legislative
delegation of broad discretionary power with vague standards; it is
the procrastination of administrators in resorting to the rule-making
power to replace vagueness with clarity. All concerned should push
administrators toward earlier and more diligent use of the rule-
making power... reviewing courts should push.
97
When prison officials fail to accord inmates their constitutional rights,
court intervention becomes necessary. Society can ill afford a conclu-
sion to the contrary.
ARTHUR H. ACKERHALT
97. K. DAVIS, supra note 44, at 56-57 (emphasis in original).
